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Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a topic of both contemporary and historical interest in the age of 
what has been called a global counterinsurgency. It is totally appropriate that historians 
should devote attention to COIN doctrine that is being rediscovered by military organisations 
and that has spawned its own ‘latter-day priesthood.’ This priesthood argues that population-
centric, ‘hearts and minds’ doctrines offers a formula for success in winning over people and 
places in the grip of terrorist organisations.1  
 
This latest espousal of COIN as a war-winning formula by a group of military intellectuals and 
commanders ironically comes at a time when historians are increasingly questioning whether 
‘hearts and minds’ strategies – anchored in minimum force, aid to the civil, and tactically 
flexible formations – ever actually formed the core of COIN strategies, let alone whether they 
were as effective as their proponents claimed.2 Doubts over whether COIN will be able to 
deliver victory in Afghanistan,3 as well as the very tenuous stability produced by the so-called 
‘surge’ in Iraq, have generated a number of COIN critics who argue that historical claims for 
COIN success, based on courting popular gratitude by improving economic conditions, are at 
best anchored in selective historical memory, when not fantasy fabrications.4  
 
A second complaint is that COIN is a Western construct. Not only do COIN theorists, in the 
words of Brian Lynn, “project U.S. values onto foreign populations.”5 In addition, they operate 
within the context of liberal peace theory and its “single sustainable model of national success: 
freedom, democracy, and free enterprise,”6 in the words of the 2002 U.S. National Security 
Strategy. Rather than a vehicle for modern state-building, COIN is denounced as a revival of 
nineteenth century divide-and-rule imperialism masquerading as state-building.  
 
Given the rich history of COIN going back over at least two centuries, the activities at the CIHM 
conference are not merely an exercise in historical curiosity. They can provide a perspective, a 
reality check, a foundational investigation into the assumptions and strategic context in which 
COIN has developed and in which it is applies. This examination should help to remind 
strategists, planners, intelligence operatives, politicians and others, that while insurgencies 
share certain common characteristics, every insurgency plays out in a particular historical 
context, is the product of a particular set of grievances and is shaped by unique ethnic, 
geographic, resource, ideological and strategic factors that defy a formulaic approach. 
 
COIN: past and present 
 
That COIN gradually emerged as a separate category of warfare can be linked to two historic 
factors: the professionalization of European warfare in the nineteenth century, and the 
emergence of a coherent doctrine of subversion in the twentieth. Wellesley may have been 
derided as a “Sepoy general” by Napoleon, but his India experience was not seen as a 
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disqualifier for command in Europe. However, the professionalization of European warfare in 
the nineteenth century left French imperial soldiers with the feeling that the conquest and 
policing of empire was professionally undervalued – a category of sub-war considered a poor 
preparation for ‘real’ war on the European continent. Critics complained that proficiency in 
imperial warfare was bought at the expense of preparation for continental conflict. This was 
especially true in France, where blame for the 1870 defeat against Prussia was laid at the feet 
of ‘African’ generals, whose decades of experience in raids and skirmishes in Algeria and Mexico 
was judged poor preparation for ‘real’ war.  
 
The foundation of the post-1871 French military renaissance rested on the assumption that 
metropolitan and colonial warfare constituted separate categories of conflict. Liberated from 
Clausewitzian constraints, colonial soldiers were free to characterise their brand of warfare in 
Jominian terms. In the 1890s, Callwell and Lyautey defined a ‘small wars school,’ which 
emphasised not only the nobility of imperial soldiering, but also its unique requirements. 
Callwell argued that small war constituted “an art by itself” that required considerable tactical 
flexibility, unlike what he categorised as the “stereotyped system” prevalent in Europe.7  
 
Lyautey publicised the “oil spot” and “combining politics with force” methods of Generals 
Pennequin and Gallieni. Efforts to separate colonial warfare from its conventional counterpart 
were calculated to bolster the image of colonial soldiering as a unique calling and a specialised 
category of conflict. It also sought to neutralise the intrusion of the national government into 
the management of imperial conquest. So, what was presented as imperial military methods 
became both a public relations exercise and a ‘tactic in a box’ to market foreign expansion as 
both effortless and low risk. COIN offered a win-win formula that would both expand the 
influence of the homeland and benefit the local populations, who would see invasion as a 
‘liberation.’ 
 
Mao’s People’s War and the birth of COIN 
 
A second factor that contributed to the elevation of COIN into a stand-alone category of 
warfare was the globalisation of insurgency following the Great War, first as an anti-imperial, 
nationalist phenomenon, and subsequently as a theory of subversion anchored in a communist-
inspired ‘people’s war.’ Mao’s assertion – that if properly organised and sequenced, insurgency 
can produce strategic results – turned post-1918 nationalist rebellions into an orchestrated 
communist threat to the West’s ‘civilising mission.’  
 
Surprisingly, given the French lack of success against what they categorised as la guerre 
révolutionnaire in the post-1945 wars, the latest U.S. Army/Marine Corps f ield manual 3-
24 ,  Counterinsurgency  claims to take inspiration in part from a French veteran of the 
Algerian war, David Galula. But Galula is simply the preamble for the true unfinished business 
that inspires what is being referred to as the COINista school: the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. 
Fundamental to the COINista ideology is the U.S. Army’s alleged institutional aversion to 
counterinsurgency, which brought defeat in Vietnam, a charge most forcefully put by Andrew 




Indeed, the COINista gospel asserts that there is a right and wrong way to fight insurgencies. If 
the French proved to be too brutal and the U.S. military was too structurally conventional and 
firepower focused, the British developed the correct balance between persuasion and force. 
Thus, while COINistas’ shared memory starts with Vietnam, their historiography begins with 
Tom Mockaitis’s 1990 British counterinsurgency, which basically argues that building on the 
lessons of the 1919 Amritsar massacre and the 1921 loss of Eire, London institutionalised the 
idea of ‘minimum force,’ civil-military cooperation ‘aid to the civil,’ and tactical flexibility based 
on decentralised decision-making as the central principles of its counterinsurgency operations.  
 
The rise of neo-imperialism in the 1990s provided the intellectual climate that, following the 
9/11 attack on the United States, has jumpstarted the COIN renaissance. Such neo-imperialists 
as Max Boot, Robert Kaplan, Niall Ferguson, and the liberal internationalist Joseph Nye have 
argued that the requirement for international order compels the West led by the United States 
once again to take up the ‘White Man’s Burden,’ predicting that the universal appeal of 
Western values and institutions will cause right-thinking non-Western peoples to welcome 
occupation as a liberation.  
 
The ‘end of history’ opened the door to a group of young U.S. officers who see 
counterinsurgency as a mission set and who offer COIN as a doctrine around which the U.S. 
military can organise, much as British officers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
embraced the preservation of empire their raison d’être. John Nagl’s Learning to eat soup with 
a knife resurrects the 1970s debate about the nature of the Vietnam War. Nagl’s arguments are 
echoed by Australian COIN expert David Kilcullen, who, in his 2010 The accidental guerrilla: 
fighting small wars in the midst of a big one, repeats the mantra that counterinsurgency 




There are several problems with the COINista arguments, but let’s begin by challenging the 
Mockaitis-Nagl assertion that the British military broke the code on counterinsurgency in the 
inter-war years and managed to become an exemplary ‘learning organisation’ that transmitted 
its ‘minimum force/aid to the civil’ wisdom through the generations. The British Army did not 
have a particularly exemplary record at COIN or at any warfare, for that matter, at the time of 
Malaya. In The politics of the British Army, Hew Strachan argues that ‘aid to the civil’ was not 
imperial practice and that victories in British colonial campaigns were bought with timely 
political concessions, not earned through the efficiency of British COIN tactics.9  
 
As for national styles of counterinsurgency, Chris Bayly and Tim Harper writing of 
decolonisation in Southeast Asia and David Anderson’s masterful book on the Mau Mau have 
revealed them as wars every bit as repressive – even ‘dirty’ – as those fought by the French.10 
‘Minimum force’ and unity of civil-military control were treated as foreign concepts in North 
Ireland between 1969 and 1976, which contributed to the notorious Bloody Sunday incident of 






What are the important takeaways about COIN? First, the claim that COIN constitutes a 
separate category of warfare, one made at least since the 1890s, is contentious at best. In the 
final analysis, Callwell’s definition of COIN as “an art by itself” basically boils down to a mastery 
of small unit tactics, the acquisition of tactical intelligence, and a capacity to drink endless 
glasses of tea with tribal sheiks as they exact their price for cooperation. Historically, COIN-
centric armies – the French in 1870 and the British in two World Wars – have had trouble 
adapting to conventional operations, not vice versa. Krepinevich argues that the U.S. Army in 
Vietnam failed to make the transition from conventional to COIN, and so lost. But the basic 
problem for the Americans in Vietnam was the strategic context in which the war was fought, 
not the tactics used. Meanwhile, ‘conventional’ U.S. forces have proven quick learners in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
 
A second point is that, in many settings, COIN methods are mustered to support an agenda 
based on a set of assumptions that are quintessentially Western, and hence alien and 
unrealisable. Strategic goals like exporting ‘freedom,’ ‘democracy’ and the free enterprise 
system abroad as laid out in the U.S. National Security Strategy are at a best vague, when not 
totally destabilising, policy framework in which to implement COIN doctrine. Third, the role of 
historians is to establish the factual record so that mythologized versions of the past are not 
offered as a formula for the future. Theories based in shoddy research and flawed and selective 
analysis of cases are not only a-historical. They can lead to people getting killed because they 
fail to convey that each insurgency is a contingent event in which doctrine, operations, and 
tactics must support a viable policy and strategy, not the other way around.  
 
Last, my guess is that we are on the downside of COIN for a variety of reasons, beginning with 
the fact that the ‘liberal peace’ justification for intervention is becoming less attractive to 
Western populations, if for no other reason that it has become horribly expensive. But the 
certainty is that predictions for success of COIN doctrines anchored in mythologized history and 
selective memory are perilous propositions. 
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